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A proof of the (strengthened) Liar formula in a 
semantical extension of Peano Arithmetic
Jeffrey Ketland
Let PA be standard first-order Peano Arithmetic in L, the first-order
language of arithmetic. Let PA(S) be a semantical extension of PA obtained
by adding a primitive satisfaction predicate SatL(x, y), governed by Tars-
kian axioms. Let LS be the resulting language – i.e., L plus the new
primitive SatL(x, y). The system of axioms governing SatL(x, y) was given
in Tarski 1936. Anyone interested in delving into some highly technical
work on this topic could consult Feferman 1991, Kaye 1991 and Halbach
1999.1
The philosophical significance of such semantical extensions is discussed
in Ketland 1999, where such extensions are compared with minimalistic
extensions generated by adding just the ‘T-scheme’ (the set of formulas
TrL(«ϕ») ↔ϕ, where ϕ does not contain TrL(x)). These latter extensions
are conservative. Similar constructions are considered in Shapiro 1998.
And, as both Shapiro and I argued, the issue of (non-)conservativeness of
adding a theory of truth to a base theory can be related to the issue of defla-
tionism about truth.2
1 The notation PA(S) is due to Kaye 1991. It is worth mentioning that an ambiguity
arises concerning what is meant, in defining the satisfaction-theoretic extension, by
‘adding’ the new axioms which contain new vocabulary. The ambiguity is whether to
expand the induction scheme in PA to include formulas containing SatL(x, y). It turns
out that if induction is not expanded (which is arguably ‘unnatural’), then PA + satis-
faction axioms is a conservative extension . However, if induction is expanded, so
inductive proofs involving the formulas containing SatL and TrL can be formalized,
then the extension PA + satisfaction axioms is a non-conservative extension, and
indeed, this is the theory we refer to as PA(S). The non-conservativeness is witnessed
by the fact that PA(S)g Con(PA).
(In fact, the system PA(S) is fully intertranslatable with a certain subsystem of
second-order arithmetic called ACA (‘Arithmetic Comprehension Axiom’). See
Halbach 1999).
2 The crux of the matter is that it can be shown that PA(S)g True(PA) where True(PA)
is the ‘soundness’ formula ∀x(Prov(x)→ Tr(x)) (or ‘Global Reflection Principle’) and
where Prov(x) is the standard provability predicate for PA. So, PA(S) proves that ‘any
theorem of PA is true’. Indeed, an analogous construction can be given for any
sufficiently rich formalized system F (such as ZFC) resulting in a semantical extension
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Introduce within this theory the truth predicate TrL(x), governed by the
explicit definition,
(1) ∀x(TrL(x)↔(SenL(x) ∧∀y(Seq(y)→ SatL(x,y))))
The idea is that SatL(x,y) expresses the satisfaction relation between (codes
of) L-formulas and (codes of) sequences.3 Then TrL(x) expresses the
concept of truth for such L sentences. It can be shown that this theory satis-
fies Tarski’s Convention T: i.e.,
(2) PA(S) g TrL(«ϕ») ↔ ϕ
for each closed formula ϕ of L. This syntactic looking fact has a nice
model-theoretic corollary. Let (M, S, Tr) be any model of PA(S). Let #ϕ be
the gödel number of the L-formula ϕ. Then the fact (2) entails that, for any
closed L-formula ϕ,
(3) #ϕ ∈ Tr ⇔ M f ϕ
Furthermore, it can easily be shown that any model of PA(S) will assign to
TrL(x) exactly the (codes of) L-sentences that hold in the reduct M. That
is, it gets the extension of TrL(x) exactly right. It is important to notice the
presence of the formula SenL(x) in the definition of TrL(x). It is this which
ensures that only (the codes of) L-sentences enter extension of TrL(x).
Hence,
(4) If (M, S, Tr) f PA(S) then Tr = {#ϕ : M f ϕ and ϕ ∈ Sen(L)}
To return to the main point, there is an L-formula SenL(x) which strongly
defines within PA(S) the (recursive) set of codes of closed L-formulas. That
is,
(5) If ϕ is a closed L-formula, then PA(S) g SenL(«ϕ») 
(6) If ϕ is not a closed L-formula then PA(S) g ¬SenL(«ϕ»)
Furthermore, the definition (1) of TrL(x) guarantees that the following holds:
(7) PA(S) g ∀x(TrL(x) → SenL(x))
3 Normally, the metatheory requires a certain amount of set theory. However, only
finite sequences are needed to recursively define satisfaction for first-order languages, all
of whose formulas contain only finitely many variables. The reason is that the class of
finitesequencesofnaturalnumbersiscountableandrecursive:thuseachsuchsequence
can be coded (in an effective manner) as a number. Then a predicate Seq(x) strongly
defining this set can be defined in PA. Thus, we assume that the sole new concept
introduced into PA(S) is the concept expressed by satisfaction predicate SatL(x, y).
 
F(S). The analogous result is that F(S)g dash True(F). It is clear that this is a proper
extension of F, because F(S)g Con(F). I do not know whether the strength of such
systems have been examined in any more detail.
Incidentally, it is known that PA(S)g PH, the Paris-Harrington formula which is
famously not a theorem of PA. See Kaye 1991.
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Next, think about the Diagonalization Lemma (or Fixed Point Theo-
rem). The system PA(S) satisfies the requirements of this theorem (it is an
extension of Robinson Arithmetic Q). Thus, there must be a fixed point
formula λ such that,
(8) PA(S) g λ↔ ¬TrL(«λ»)
The analysis of the proof of the Diagonalization Lemma4 shows that this
formula λ must contain the new predicate TrL(x). Indeed, because the
truth-in-L predicate TrL(x) cannot, by Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem, be
defined in PA, it follows that such a formula is not a closed L-formula (and
is not logically equivalent to or logically interdeducible with any L-
formula). Thus, λ must be an LS formula.
This formula λ is the formal analogue of the so-called ‘strengthened liar’
for our formalized semantical system PA(S). It is a formula that ‘says of
itself that it is not true’. But what does ‘true’ mean here? Well, it has to
mean ‘true-in-L’. Intuitively, this claim is, in fact, correct: i.e., λ is, in fact,
not true-in-L. Thus, λ is, in fact, true (in LS). This is, in effect, Tarski’s own
resolution of the liar paradox (including the strengthened liar).
We shall use the above facts (5) – (8) to deduce something rather inter-
esting. Namely, that the strengthened liar formula λ is a theorem of PA(S).
Thus, λ is provably true-in-LS! The required proof that the formula λ is a
theorem of PA(S) is triviality itself. Since, as we noted, λ is not a closed L-
formula, we can deduce from (6) that,
(9)  g PA(S) g ¬SenL(«λ»)
It immediately follows from (7) that,
(10) PA(S) g ¬TrL(«λ»)
and thus, from (8),
(11) PA g λ
This interesting result deserves further comment. Intuitively, PA(S) is in
fact true (it is certainly true in the standard expansion (N,S,Tr)5 of the
4 See, e.g., (Boolos Jeffrey 1989). If ϕ is any formula, then the diagonalization of ϕ, call
it Diag(ϕ), is the formula ∃x(x= «ϕ»∧ ϕ). (Note that if ϕ contains the variable x free,
then Diag(ϕ) is equivalent to the formula ϕ(«ϕ») which obviously says that ϕ is true
of the code of itself). Taking codes, we get the diagonal function diag on numbers.
This function is provably recursive. So, suppose that the L-formula Diag(x, y) repre-
sents (in our theory PA(S)) this diagonal function diag. Next let Φ be the LS-formula
∃y(Diag(x, y)∧ ¬TrL(y)). Finally, let λ be Diag(Φ). It then quickly follows that λ ↔
¬TrL(«λ») is a theorem of PA(S).
5 S is the satisfaction relation on the standard model N. I.e., it is the set of pairs (n, m)
where n is the code of an L-formula ϕ and m is the code of some finite sequence s and
N fs ϕ; and Tr is the corresponding set of codes of true formulas (in N).
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intended structure N). It follows that λ is, in fact, true (or, if you like, it
holds in (N,S,Tr)). Furthermore, it follows that ¬TrL(«λ») is also true!
This correctly expresses the fact that the LS-formula λ is in fact not true in
L: it is not true in L for the rather trivial ‘syntactic’ reason that λ is not
equivalent to any L-formula. Indeed, it turns out that the λ’s code – the
number #λ – cannot be an element of Tr, for this set is constrained by the
definition of TrL(x) given above ((1)) to be a subset of the set (of codes) of
closed L-formulas. The formula λ is the formal equivalent for our formal
system PA(S) of the strengthened liar, which allegedly ‘says of itself that it
is not a true sentence’. But, in our study, this claim is actually true. The
strengthened liar sentence λ is not even a sentence of L, and is a fortiori not
a true sentence of L. However, λ is, in fact, a true sentence of the extended
language LS and is, in fact, provable in PA(S).
The London School of Economics
Houghton Street, LONDON WC2A 2AE
j.j.ketland@lse.ac.uk
References
Boolos, G. and R. Jeffrey. 1989. Computability and Logic . Third edition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Feferman, S. 1991. Reflecting on incompleteness. Journal of Symbolic Logic 56: 1–49.
Halbach, V. 1999. Conservative theories of classical truth. Studia Logica 62: 353–70.
Kaye, R. 1991. Models of Peano Arithmetic. (Oxford Logic Guides 15). Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Ketland, J. 1999. Deflationism and Tarski’s paradise. Mind 108: 69–94.
Shapiro, S. 1998. Truth and proof – through thick and thin. Journal of Philosophy 95:
493–522.
Tarski, A. 1936. Der wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen. Studia Philosoph-
ica 1: 261–405. English translation, by J. H. Woodger, ‘The concept of truth in
formalized languages’, appeared in A. Tarski 1956, Logic, Semantics and Metama-
thematics: Papers by Alfred Tarski from 1923 to 1938 . Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
